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ABSTRACT  
The ASEAN is once again at the forefront of a super power rivalry, 
this time between the US and China with the South China Sea as its 
setting. Against the increasing security dilemma in the South China 
Sea and threat of great power rivalry, a change in the characterization 
of the region’s security outlook from an essentially military definition 
to comprehensive security is necessary. This refers to 
interdependence and cooperation in economic development, 
scientific research, and a general enhancement of human 
interactions. The establishment of an ASEAN-led maritime regime 
against piracy could initiate the foundation for a resolution to the 
South China Sea disputes and encourage cooperation and foster 
understanding in Sino-US rivalry in the region. 
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he ASEAN has made great strides in formulating treatises and 
policies that function as guiding principles in the conduct of 
its affairs. The forging of the zone of Peace, Freedom and 
Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in November 1971 called for a stable 
security in the region free of any external influence. The Treaty of 
Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in 1976 provided a mechanism and 
process for the peaceful settlement of disputes. The SEANWZ 
(nuclear weapons free zone) is the organization’s contribution to 
nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. 
Perhaps the most significant of ASEAN’s politico-security 
component is the ASEAN regional forum (ARF) established in 
1994 where regional security issues between ASEAN and its 
dialogue partners (as well as non-ASEAN states) are discussed 
under the guiding principles and standards of the ASEAN 
(Severino, 2009). 
One of the most pressing security issues affecting the ASEAN 
was the dispute in the South China Sea involving China, Taiwan 
and some ASEAN states. China and Vietnam have gone to war 
over the Spratlys in 1974 resulting in a number of casualties 
(“Armed conflict”, 2011). The Chinese occupied Philippine-
claimed Mischief reef in 1995 and in 1999 upgraded its structures. 
Given its size, rapid economic and military modernization, as well 
as its assertive stance on its claims, China is seen to be taking a 
“creeping jurisdiction” and “creeping assertiveness” in the South 
China Sea (Guan, 1999). According to Yahuda (2012), China’s 
actions in the South China Sea have raised the fears of its 
neighbors and have elicited US involvement in the Asia Pacific 
region looking specifically at the activities in the South China Sea. 
The ASEAN is once again in the midst of a great power rivalry, 
this time between the US and China. The US adopted a new focus 
on the Asia Pacific region in its global security strategy and China 
T 
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is focusing on deterrents to counter specific US military technology 
under its 3 defense and 3 attacks initiative (Snyder, 2004). 
Meanwhile, the ASEAN lacks a common position in engaging 
China (Leifer, 1995) and as sort of countervailing factor, regional 
states have increased military spending and hardware acquisitions. 
Likewise, they have involved the US in the disputes to which the 
US acceded during the ARF foreign ministers meeting in Hanoi in 
July 2010, where it expressed its intentions of keeping the sea-lanes 
of communication (SLOC) open and safe much to China’s 
objection (Pomfret, 2010). 
Security dilemma 
Aside from the ASEAN Declaration on the Conduct of Parties 
in the South China Sea (DOC) in November 2002 between ASEAN 
and China, there is no specific approach to the defusing of tensions 
in the South China Sea. Being a non-binding declaration, the DOC 
has failed to implement its clauses since its inception (Wain, 2011). 
Given these realities and a brewing Sino-US rivalry, there is a 
call for the establishment of cooperation and a conflict-resolution 
mechanism to avoid conflict in the South China Sea among 
claimants and prevent a great power rivalry between the US and 
China. According to the DOC, until the establishment of a lasting 
resolution of the conflict, parties may engage in cooperation in 
transnational security concerns. 
In an effort to arrest the increasing security dilemma, there 
should be a change in the characterization of the region’s security 
outlook from an essentially military definition to one of 
comprehensive security. Comprehensive security implies that 
security should be achieved through a web of interdependence 
including cooperation in economic development, scientific  
 
96                               QUILALA IV / AN ASEAN MARITIME REGIME 
 
 
 
 
 
CHINESE STUDIES PROGRAM LECTURE SERIES     © Ateneo de Manila University 
No. 1, 2014: 93–101                                                                   http://journals.ateneo.edu 
 
research, and a general enhancement of human interactions. 
Accordingly, military might alone does not define security nor 
generate long-term peace (Valencia, 2000). 
Safe navigation in the SLOCs and piracy is a common 
transnational security concern. Dr. David Zweig (2012) refers to 
the importance of the SLOCs to China’s access to oil from the 
Middle East and its quest for energy security. China is concerned 
that any destabilization in the SLOCs might affect its oil supply. It 
also considers the United States’ leanings of the littoral states in the 
SLOCs as well as the US itself and its increased involvement in the 
region as threats to its energy security. 
Similarly, the US has committed freedom and safe navigation in 
the SLOCs during the July 2010 ARF meeting in Hanoi. The 
ASEAN relies heavily on the Straits of Malacca, Sunda, and 
Lombok, collectively referred to as the “choke point straits” (Noer, 
1995) and the South China Sea as vital supply routes and has 
shown its commitment in ensuring the safety of the sea lanes 
through growing (bilateral) military cooperation. Indonesia has 
conducted joint air, naval, army maneuvers with Malaysia and has 
cooperated in patrolling their common South China Sea border 
areas. Indonesia has conducted joint naval surveillance in the 
Celebes Sea with the Philippines (Valencia, 2000). 
Piracy has been threatening the SLOCs in Southeast Asia, 
reaching its peak in 2000 when 242 out of 469 incidents of piracy 
occurred in the region, according to the international maritime 
bureau (IMB). The period from 2005-2009 saw a decrease in piracy 
on account of some success by cooperation among Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and Singapore, as well as the shifting of piracy activities 
to the Horn of Africa. However, in 2010, piracy seemed to have 
returned to Southeast Asia with a 60% increase in its activities 
(Banlaoi, 2011). 
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Recommendation 
There is a clear and common interest in maintaining safety and 
freedom of navigation in the SLOCs among the stakeholders in the 
region. Cooperation among states is possible if it is consistent with 
a state’s own objectives and requires the adjustment of its own 
policies in the hopes of reciprocity from the other state it 
cooperates with. In the formation of a multilateral maritime 
regime against piracy, it similarly requires that states adjust their 
policies concerning a particular issue or area and in this case, safety 
in the SLOCs from piracy (Valencia, 2000). 
Concerned states should focus on the issues of navigation safety 
and piracy as reasons for the establishment of a maritime regime 
since: 1) it is a concern of all states in the region; 2) there are 
ongoing independent unilateral, bilateral, and trilateral initiatives 
in addressing the issue; 3) the issue of piracy is a transnational 
security threat where states are more willing to be involved in 
rather than politico-military security in the strict sense; 4) it is a 
chance to involve all stakeholders and engage in dialogue on areas 
of common interest; 5) it opens communication among disputing 
states;  6) the DOC would be more relevant and have concrete 
significance in carrying out its clauses; 7) there is some degree of 
success in curbing piracy owing to cooperative efforts of some 
ASEAN states; and 8) addressing piracy could lead to other 
avenues for greater cooperation in addressing environmental 
problems caused by piracy such as oil spills and its containment 
(Bulkely, 2003). 
The anti-piracy multilateral regime should be headed by the 
ASEAN which will be the hub, while the other participating 
nations and stakeholders such as the US and China, and to a lesser 
extent, Japan, Korea and Australia, will be the spokes similar to the  
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framework of the ARF. China is willing to have ASEAN take the 
leadership in multilateral regimes addressing economic and non-
traditional issues (Shen, 2011). However, ASEAN has to move 
away from its dialogue and forum-oriented roots to one that is 
more binding to enforce the anti-piracy function of the regime. 
The three ASEAN littoral states at the center of these strategic 
“choke points,” Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, should be 
given the helm of this multilateral regime since they have initiated 
the strait of Malacca Safe Navigation Scheme and the ASEAN 
Maritime Forum which was established in 2010 to address 
maritime security issues. The former is funded by Japan and has a 
revolving fund of US$1.3 million since Japan relies heavily on 
freedom of the navigation for its economy and energy needs. 
Japan’s inclusion in the ASEAN-led maritime regime would enrich 
the scope of the organization. 
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore would have to involve other 
ASEAN states in maritime operations in the SLOCs near their 
jurisdiction as well as China and the US. 
Similarly, both powers have to set their differences aside and 
cooperate with this ASEAN-initiated regime in ensuring 
navigation safety in the region. Having the three ASEAN countries 
spearhead the regime would dispel China’s fears of containment. 
Indonesia has been known to initiate Track II dialogues in the 
South China Sea and Malaysia is identified as one of the ASEAN 
states that views China’s rise as peaceful and benign (Shee, 2004). 
Notably, in its anti-piracy operations in the Horn of Africa in 
December 2008, China expressed its willingness to conduct 
intelligence information and sharing with the US in its anti-piracy 
efforts (Kaufman, 2009). 
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The ASEAN-China DOC was ratified in November 2002 and 
has yet to be implemented. With the growing tension in the South 
China Sea and the brewing Sino-US rivalry, it is an opportune time 
for the implementation of the DOC. The establishment of an 
ASEAN piracy maritime regime is consistent with the DOC and 
such a mechanism would require a more binding framework. This 
regime would be under the framework of cooperation and 
comprehensive security bringing together the ASEAN, the US, 
China and Japan as well as Korea and Australia, to collaborate 
under one concern thereby increasing mutual understanding and 
building communication. An ASEAN-led maritime regime against 
piracy could be the basis for more binding mechanisms in the 
South China Sea disputes in the future and foster confidence 
building between the US and China bound within the principles of 
the ASEAN. 
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